

unknown). But I myself must be assured of coming back in order to contact them.  
 The Colonel Director told me that my extension would not pose any problems,  
 but I do not find his statement sufficient.

R. Winkler

The Final Battle Against the Viet Minh

Reply from Colonel Morlane to Colonel Trinquier

Lieutenant-Colonel MORLANE

Boite Postale (P.O. Box) 40-20, Paris

Paris, 4 March 1954

My dear Trinquier,

I did indeed receive your letter of 20 February, to which I did not immediately reply since I was very busy, as you know, and also because I needed some time to study some of the questions which you pose.

The problem of assignments is regulated very carefully, and I intervene as much as I can to facilitate the regulation. It is not easy, because quality personnel are grabbed up in Paris as they are in Saigon.

I certainly did not expect specialists, the 11th shock group or the old GCMA personnel, intended by the DM (expansion unknown) to serve in the GMI, to be assigned to the TAPI.

There is a lack of flexibility and even of understanding on the part of the EMIFT, which surprises me.

It is important to develop a coherent relief system for the GMI, but we always encounter great difficulties.

The officers currently training at Cercottes make an excellent impression, with the exception of a Lieutenant Alain, about whom we shall make our feelings clearer in notes at the end of his training.

You continue to have many irons in the fire, but I must tell you that despite the magnificent successes achieved by the logistic office of the EMIFT, the growth of the GMI makes me a little dizzy, just as the organization of the search for intelligence makes me a little worried.

Among the relief problems, the most important is obviously the choice of a new leader. You have found a very elegant solution which, according to what you have told me, has garnered all the votes, but would you have any reason to hide something from me?

You have just had a very long and very brilliant tour in Indochina. This is a very harsh profession which not only uses up one's physical resistance, but also his credit. A moment comes when it is necessary to pass the baton to someone else. I am very much afraid that you are not interested in remaining at the head of GMI after May, to say nothing of the fact that the interim during your furlough may provoke some catastrophe.

The question seems to be envisaged from this angle at Saigon, where the names of possible successors have already been put forth. If, for family reasons, you must return to Indochina in October, it would be wiser in my opinion to find you a landing point right now. This is a much better solution than a last minute surprise.

Hoping that you will be grateful for my frankness, I ask you to present my respectful regards to Mrs. Trinqueter.

Sincerely yours,  
H. Morlane

P.S. Thanks for having thought of the Thai medal for Dubezzies. Dubezzies is always full of drive, but it would be better to send him his medal, because he is performing great services for me, and I will not let him leave for Indochina for several months.

The Committee of Liberation of the Upper Red River (CGLRR)  
Commander-in-Chief of the Ground, Air and Naval Forces in Indochina  
Composite Intervention Group

Regional Representation of GMI in North Vietnam  
Telephone--Central/Abroge; No. 512/D.I

S.P. 73.428, 23 April 1954

Report of Meeting

A COMMITTEE OF LIBERATION OF THE UPPER REGION OF THE RED RIVER has been set up at Hanoi on 15 April 1954 as a consequence of deliberations among the native military authorities and prominent people who are currently participating in the war against the Viet Minh either by directing guerrilla operations behind the Viet Minh or by contributing the traditional influence of their presence to the undergrounds, or by collaborating in the joint activity of liberating territory.

Président		● LY SEO NUNG	
Vice Présidents		pour :	
2 Rive droite	{	● SECO THINH	● CARDAMONE
		● NGUYEN DINH TAN	● KHONE SAY
		● CAM NGOC CHUNG	● HANS KHAN
2 Rive gauche	{	● PHAM DUC LONG	● CORAIL
		● HOANG CHUNG DZIM	● CHOCOLAT
11 Secrétaire		● HOANG LUNG	
5 Membres		pour :	
2 Rive droite	{	● DEO VAN AN	● CARDAMONE
		● DAO VINH PHUC	● CARDAMONE
		● MAN VAN LA	● KHONE SAY
		● CAM BINH	● HANS KHAN
		● CAM NGOC TAN	● HANS KHAN
3 Rive gauche	{	● LO WEN TEU	
		● HOANG SUNG CO	
		● NUNG GIUNG SANG	
		● HOANG DAU SANG	

Key: 1-for, 2-right bank, 3-left bank, 4-secretary, 5-members.

The Committee established presented itself to Battalion Chief Tourner, the Commander of the GMI/Tonkin, who officially accepted it, since this organization actually embodies the structure of the undergrounds established by GMI/Tonkin since February 1954.

SDECE Reply to the CLHFR Proposal

SDECE Office in Indochina  
Satgon, 21 May, 1954

No. 15.590/B.IXD/DIR

SECRET

The SDECE Director Delegate in Indochina

to Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding the Composite Intervention Group

Subject: Committee of Liberation of the Upper Red River

I have the honor of acknowledging receipt of your letter No. 216/3/OPS of

18 May 1954 on the subject of the Committee of Liberation of the Upper Red River

and the attached documents.

This is the first time I have heard of a Committee of Liberation of the Upper

Red River.

A study of the associated file arouses the following observations on my part:

# I

Copy of the Report of Meeting No. 572/D.I of 23 April 1954 of the Commander of

the Composite Intervention Group Regional Representation

This Report, signed jointly by the President of the Committee, the Vice

Presidents, the members of the Committee, the Commander of the Composite Inter-

vention Group Regional Representation of North Vietnam, is dated 15 April 1954.

It states that the Committee of Liberation of the High Region of the Red River

was established on 15 April 1954 at Hanoi. It does not give any indication of

the conditions under which this Committee was created. It seems impossible that

this Committee could have arisen without previous approval from the Commander of the Regional Representation.

The Committee presented itself to the Commander of the Regional Representation who "officially" accepts it. With what right and under what title?

The report is of 15 April. Copy No. 572/D.I of the Commander of the North Vietnam Regional Representation is of 23 April. On what date was it received by the Commander of the Composite Intervention Group? It seems that you have been faced with an accomplished fact, which you report in your letter No. 217/3/OPS of 18 May 1954 to the Commanding General-in-Chief.

## II

File No. 590/D.I of 27 April 1954 from the Commander of the North Vietnam Regional Representation

After having "officially" accepted the Committee and signed the resolutions made unanimously, the Commander of the Regional Representation, undoubtedly aware that he had gone too far, makes proposals to the Command, asking that the Commanding General-in-Chief accept the High Presidency of the Committee.

The file is from 27 April? What date was it received by the Command of the Composite Intervention Group?

## III

Your letter No. 216/3/OPS of 18 May 1954 to the Commanding General-in-Chief

In this letter you confirm the situation actually created by the Commander of the North Vietnam Regional Representation in presenting the initiative of your subordinate, requesting that a decision be studied and glossing over the responsibilities which he took in backing you in the report of Activity of the Composite Intervention Group of the fourth quarter of 1953. You even specify that the creation of this Committee of Liberation "follows the political line followed

of Orientation of Action (Report No. 2/DEC/CCA of 12 November 1953) and the Report (See the Report of the Meeting of Tuesday, 10 November 1953, of the Committee absolute minimum of policy in order not to compromise the future."

White Thais, and asking in brief that the GMI conducts its activity with the being careful not to make a long-term policy which would align them against the "There is no inconvenience in the GMI working with the Black Thais, but tenant-Colonel Director General of Documentation, namely:

Black Thais was examined, the Committee had accepted the proposals of the Lieutenant-Colonel Director General of Documentation, namely: underground chiefs presented, and particularly when the concrete case of the Action. When the question of the status of the underground fighters and of the Authorities responsible during the meetings of the Committee of Orientation of I also remind you that you are not ignorant of the position taken by the without authorization of the Higher Authorities".

"He has taken initiatives of a political order, without any emergency nature, him and under the same conditions, with the reason: of the North Vietnam Regional Representation. A punishment must be taken against A severe reprimand is to be addressed by you on this subject to the Commander

the international level. nature, which can have serious consequences on the Franco-Vietnamese policy and on High Authorities of Indochina are actually qualified to make decisions of this was taken and should have been the subject of special correspondence. Only the submitted to the Committee of Orientation of Action before a measure of execution The question of the creation of the Committee of Liberation should have been

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Chief or of the General Commissioner of France". of Liberation be officially created by a decision of the Commanding General-In- by the Composite Intervention Group", and you consequently ask that "the Committee

of the Meeting of 12 January 1954 of the same Committee No. 9/DEC/COA of Janu  
20 January 1954).

You and your Regional Representation Commands are not to take any initiative in the areas which can have political effects or have a political appearance. It is up to you to make proposals which must be addressed through channels for study by the Committee of Orientation of Action, the Commission of Orientation of Action, if necessary, in order to be presented to the Commanding General-in-Chief and the Commissioner General.

Although having been summoned to the Commission of Orientation of Action, which met on the afternoon of 20 May, you sent on the morning of 20 May an "urgent" telegram to the North Vietnam Regional Representation Commander, for him to envisage installing among the Red Thais a Committee of the same type as that which has just been formed for the Upper Red River.

All of this shows that the Composite Intervention Group is conducting and carrying out a "policy" despite the instructions of the Higher Authorities.

As a result and as a warning, I am drawing up a punishment report concerning you for the same reason as that drawn up for the North Vietnam Regional Representation Commander.

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With respect to the Committee of Liberation of the Upper Red River, I ask you to:

- a) Inform me of the number of copies and the list of recipients of the Report of 15 April 1954 signed by the President of the Committee, the Vice Presidents, the members of the Committee and Battalion Leader Fournier,
- b) Recover the copies,
- c) Send me the copies recovered,



- d) Draw up a list of those holding copies which have not been able to be recovered.
- e) Give me all of the specifications on the opening and the conditions for opening an account for the Committee in the Franco-Chinese Bank.
- f) Send me a copy of the Service Record No. 637/D.I of 2 May 1954 from the Commander of your North Vietnam Representation.

COPY ATC:

--Colonel Aide to the General Chief of EMIFT as a Report  
 --The Colonel Director of the Staff of the Commanding General-In-Chief as a Report.

The CLIFF and the Political Problems

General Commissariat of France in Indochina

General Office of Documentation

No. 42/D.G.D./PAC

Saigon, 21 May 1954

Commission No. 6

Report of the Meeting of 20 May 1954

Commission No. 6 met on Thursday, 20 May 1954, under the Chairmanship of

Colonel Fleuret.

Present were: Messrs. Gerles, Director of the Civilian Staff of the Com-

missioner General,

Ship's Captain Malincent, Director of the Military Staff of the Commissioner General,

Lieutenant-Colonel Vity, Director General of Documentation,

Battalion Chief Deljeu, Aide to the Director General of Documentation,

Battalion Chief Proudhon, the Representative of the Commanding General-In-Chief,

Begs, the Political Advisor of the Commissioner General,

Colonel Belloux, the Director Delegate of SDECE, and

Lieutenant-Colonel Trinquier, GMI Commander.

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I

The purpose of the meeting was to examine solutions to be envisaged with respect to the future of the undergrounds in view of the current situation.

II

After a discussion of the question, the Commission believes that the undergrounds should continue their activity with the same intensity as previously, while adapting themselves to the new military situation created by the fall of Dien Bien Phu.

III

In case the Geneva conversations should end in a "cease-fire", it believes that the undergrounds should still continue their operations, or at least be kept in reserve to form a potential force which can be used if necessary.

a)---Consequently the Commission is opposed to revealing in the current negotiations the existence of the undergrounds as an argument for the creation of demilitarized zones. Actually, if such zones were created, there would be a risk of seeing the installation of composite commissions responsible for controlling the disarmament of the troops, whether regular or irregular. Since the purpose is to preserve the undergrounds in hiding, the idea of transforming the underground fighters into regular troops is abandoned; at a later time it would lead to their disarmament which, incidentally, would be very difficult or even impossible in view of the independent nature of these political-military organizations.

b)---Therefore the Commission believes that it is preferable, after informing the native leaders, to evacuate the French staffs, to officially deny any French participation in the organization of the undergrounds, and to maintain with them only a clandestine connection.

In case of evacuation of Laotian territory by the Viet Minh troops, the undergrounds could be of great usefulness on the intelligence level, especially those who might be at the edge of future Viet Minh zones.

c)—The Commission requests that the French Delegation to Geneva be apprised of this position, and that in particular it does not reveal the demilitarized zones based on the existence of the undergrounds, a study of which seems to have been made already.

#### IV

The Commission gives its approval to the transitional measures taken by the GMI Commander in anticipation of a later period of rest for the undergrounds, namely:

- 1) Food and stocking arms, ammunition and paddy.
- 2) Measures proper to assure the maintenance of radio communication.

Having been informed of the creation of a "Political Committee of Liberation of the Upper Red River" at Hanoi, the Commission gives its approval to this activity to the extent that it remains within the initiative of the local underground leaders. On the other hand, it issues distinctly unfavorable advice on making this activity official and sponsored by official French agencies or officers.

For Colonel Fleurant

President of the Commission

No. 6

Lieutenant-Colonel Vitry

Secretary

Signed: Vitry

# Punition du Colonel Trinquier à propos du CLHFR

2	REGION	3	Corps de service <u>1er R.I.T.</u> <u>Colonne</u>	4	Mouvement
Carrière <u>C.T.D.E.</u>			Article <u>33</u> du statut		
<b>5 COMPTE-RENDU D'UNE PUNITION</b> Imposée à un officier					
7	Nom et Grade de l'officier puni	8 <u>TRINQUIER</u> <u>Major</u> <u>Lieutenant Colonel chef de GAT</u>			
9	Nom et Grade de l'officier qui rédige la punition	10 <u>Colonel Baillou</u> <u>Délégué du Directeur de la Direction Générale du S.D.E.C.E.</u>			
11	Niveau de la punition	12 <u>10 jours d'arrêt de rigueur</u>			
13	Circumstances ayant entraîné la punition	14 <u>H. A pris des initiatives d'ordre politique n'ayant aucun caractère d'urgence sans autorisation des Autorités Supérieures.</u>			
15	Positives satisfaisantes antérieures	16 <u>etant</u>			
17 Approbation du chef de corps ou de service ou le conseil et la manière de servir de l'officier puni					
18	19 <u>1954</u> Emplacement du C.T. <u>TRINQUIER</u>				

Key: 1-Punishment of Colonel Trinquier because of CLMTR, 2-region or garrison T.O.E. (expansion unknown) (if there is one), 3-corps or service, EMITT, 5th Section, 4-model No. 7, Article 55 of the Regulation, format: 1/4 square, 5-REPORT OF PUNISHMENT inflicted on an officer, 6-(illegible referring to form number), 7-name and rank of officer punished, 8-Trinquier, Roger, Lt.-Col., GII Chief, 9-name and rank of officer inflicting punishment, 10-Col. Bellaux, Delegate of the Director of the Office General of SDNCE, 11-nature of punishment, 12-ten days of strict (illegible), 13-circumstances accompanying the error, 14-took initiatives of a political nature with no emergency nature without authorization of Superior Authorities, 15-previous punishments (numerical), 16-none, 17-judgment of the corps or service leader on the conduct and service attitude of the officer punished, 18-rank, name and occupation of the leader of the corps (or service), initialed by Lt.-Col. Trinquier, 19-(illegible).

Letter of Farewell from Colonel Trinquier to Colonel Morlane

Saigon, 23 June 1954

My dear Morlane,

I have just received your telegram No. 296 of 26 June 1954.

I am reporting to you that, if the SDECE wants me to draw up a request for relief, such as I mentioned this morning to Colonel Belleux, I am ready to do so immediately.

Contrary to what might be supposed, I have never clung to the GMI on the departure of Colonel Grall, who did not give me any orders, but a situation obscure at the least, I went to find Colonel de Bollardiere and informed him of my lack of enthusiasm for accepting such replacement. He asked me to stay, with the principal reason mentioned by him being that, with Grall, we had drawn into this situation an entire team of young comrades, and that I did not have the right to drop them. Colonel de Bollardiere is in France, and you can ask him. This is why I accepted the heavy responsibilities which were to devolve upon me.

In addition I thought I had the total support of SDECE.

After my trip to Paris I did my best to apply the directives received in Paris--confused with TAPI, abandonment of the SOA (expansion unknown), new orientations toward South and Central Vietnam, etc., and I promised to keep you up to date through personal letters on all questions which could arise. The question of credits was never resolved. I explained this to Paris in a very detailed report. It is finally being studied seriously, and I think it can be solved.

Now, shortly after my departure, you summoned (or he came to see you) Romain-Desfosses, telling him--according to Romain-Desfosses:

"That I am blamed for using methods which were not in conformity with those of SDECE, and that my relief was being considered. At that time Romain-Desfosses became a candidate for GMI.

I had informed you in France of my desire to extend to December, and therefore I drew up a request for extension. Not receiving any reply, I wrote to you. Since you answered me that my request for relief was requested by Saigon, I addressed myself to General Navarre, asking him in effect if he had any reproaches to make against me.

General Navarre is in France, and it will be easy to verify what I am about to state.

General Navarre was surprised that there had been any question of my replacement, and that the question had never been put to him. Since a three-month furlough in France was too long an absence, he asked me to take only 45 days. If I accepted this proposal, he was prepared that very day to write to Mr. Boursicaut to ask for me to be retained, which he did.

I later reported this conversation to Colonel Belleux. I thought that this question was resolved.

Now it seems that, according to your telegram, in Paris you have not dropped the idea of my relief, and that my presence at the head of GMI is undesirable.

Therefore I took your telegram to Colonel Belleux and asked him, as I had done three months before, what complaints SDECE had drawn up against me. There were none, except for some slight matters based mainly on a bad mood, understandable from learning, when I did not expect it, that reproaches had been made against me and without my being informed of anything.

R. Trinquier.

The Return to the Shadows

Draft of Constitution of the Sects (1 May 1954)

I. WITH RESPECT TO THE FUTURE RELATIONS WITH FRANCE, THIS IS WHAT THIS DRAFT ANTICIPATES:

Negotiate new agreements. Obtain the mass transfer of powers already held by the French civil and military authorities, in order that the Vietnamese realize in a clear and indisputable way that their country is really independent.

Developed on the principle of equal association, the new treaty will concede to France cultural and economic privileges, the right of French to settle in Vietnam, and reciprocal treatment for Vietnamese to settle in France.

The R.P. V. (Assembly of Vietnamese Patriots) is particularly anxious for the agreements to be totally and faithfully applied. It recommends the creation of a "Commission for the Control of Application of the Agreements".

II. WITH RESPECT TO THE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THIS IS WHAT WAS ANTICIPATED:

The RPV suggests that the United States continue to help us (but not to buy us). That the United States try to come to an agreement with the USSR to put an end to the cold war and to neutralize Vietnam, at least temporarily (10 to 20 years, time for Vietnam to rise from its ruins).

III. RELATIONS WITH CHINA:

Geography demands that we have a non-aggression policy vis-a-vis China. Independent Vietnam will recognize the Peking government and will sign a non-aggression pact with it.

IV. POSITION OF THE R.P.V. VIS-A-VIS THE VIET MINH:

The RPV is an assembly of all of the political parties with the common denominator: the only categorical imperative "Vietnam first". It will be happy to accept into its midst communist Vietnamese if they adhere to this principle.



The RPV will try to convince the Viet Minh leaders of the necessity of putting an end to a war which, if it is continued, will bring the total ruin of our country and its subjugation to a foreign power (China or the United States). Can the two camps not come to an agreement on the following policy? (Really) free elections six months or a year after the conclusion of an agreement. Freedom (controlled by neutral powers) of propaganda of the political parties in the two zones. Election by nominal universal suffrage.

The elected assembly will draw up a constitution which the authorities of the two zones will promise to apply.

Order of the Day to the GMI

Command-in-Chief of the Ground, Air and Naval Forces in Indochina

Composite Intervention Group

GMI Regional Representation in North Vietnam

Telephone: Central ABROGE

No. 1140 D.I

S.P. 73,428, 1 August 1954

SECRET

ORDER OF THE DAY of Battalion Chief Roger Fournier, Commander of the Tonkin

Composite Intervention Group

The "cease-fire", taking effect on 27 July 1954, puts an end to the activities of the Tonkin Composite Intervention Group. On this date, since all parachuting is forbidden, our undergrounds find themselves in a critical situation. But all of our partisans have locally found solutions permitting them not to capitulate: it is with a great deal of pride that we once again note their courage, their initiative and their determination.

For those in the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Nua, who are transferred under the orders of the GML/Laos, I express my dearest wishes for peace to return to their country, which remains intact.

For you, my mountaineer friends of the Upper Tonkin, with whom I have lived through exciting hours, I must tell you of my deep affection and admiration. Since 1955, when the Viet Minh overran our High Region posts, you have risen and enlisted in the GMLA ranks, carrying on guerrilla warfare behind the enemy, harassing convoys, mining highways, and sabotaging food and ammunition depots of a numerous and well-armed enemy.

After the experiences of the Cho-Quan-Lo and Hanns undergrounds, destroyed in murderous combat, you were able to re-establish contact with your friends and relatives, thanks to the bold special missions which have demanded the admiration of everyone. Parachuted more than 100 kilometers inside the rebel zone under particularly dangerous conditions, isolated and pursued, you have succeeded in returning to us at the cost of unprecedented suffering and sacrifice. Thanks to you,

Special Mission Partisans, we were then able to relieve the entire country and address our offensive activities to Phong Tho, Chapa, Muong Bo, Lao Kay, Than Uyen, Muong-Djone and Nghia-Lo.

Finally, crowning these successes without precedent in Indochinese history, our guerrillas crossed the Red River and relieved the provinces of the left bank; i.e., the capture of Pa Kha, Yen Dinh Xa and Hoang-Su-Phi, establishing the measure of our success on the eve of the "cease-fire".

We must also mention the role that you played in the battle of Dien Bien Phu, during which you immobilized far from the main battlefield 12 Viet Minh battalions, including 8 regular ones and 12 local companies; this is one of your finest feats of arms, among so many unknown and meritorious operations which involved you in the general battle.

The GMI/Tonkin did not restrict its efforts in other regions. On the Song Ma, our Colibri, Aiglon and Calamar undergrounds permitted our troops to evacuate Na San without a shot being fired, in the face of six regular Viet Minh battalions. In the province of Phong Saly our active presence frustrated the joint efforts of three regular Viet Minh battalions who could not manage to control the region. In the regions of Santeu and Muong Soi, the guerrilla teams, decimated after the retreat from Sam Neua, rose again and an important underground formed spontaneously as a consequence.

Elsewhere the mission was even rougher; it would be necessary to cite many names from which our team withdrew after the roughest tests! Phuc Yen, Son Tay, Hadong, Tien Yen, Pho-Ba Che, Hon Me, Thanh Hoa, Vinh, Ha Tinh, Muong Sai, Muong Kaup, Muong Khoa, the Tranninh where the significant Malo-Servan mission was born, fed by the GMI/Tonkin.

In this immense guerrilla zone, where so many deeds of courage and self-denial took place every day, the food supply had to be assured in a methodical and organized way by air. The role of the General Staff and of the S.O.A.N. (expansion unknown) was of prime order there, because in these rough regions with unstable weather, personnel had to be used who were accustomed to this difficult task and fanatic in their air mission, despite the crushing fatigue and the daily risks.

Everywhere everyone also did his best in the most obscure missions of an administration....

This great machine, which the GMI/Tonkin was, "turned around" in a tedious and friendly atmosphere where everyone found the complete fulfillment of his personality in the most audacious initiatives, the customary lot of our mission: I take a great deal of pride in having been your Chief, and I thank you for it.

Now, my friends, other missions are waiting for us. If we are separated, we remain no less united by our common memories, by the particular training with which all of us are impregnated from the GMI/Tonkin.

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More than a thousand dead and three thousand wounded, such is the martyr-ology of your band of partisans who, beginning clandestinely, wanted to battle in the sun, relieve entire provinces and not count your sacrifices in a bloody struggle which involved the entire country against communism.

Today we must, without having been conquered by the Viet Minh, cease the struggle by arms and return to the shadow.

If your hearts remain faithful to the memory of your Chiefs and your comrades, to the sacrifice of our French and native dead, if your spirit retains intact the ideal of liberty which animated your arms, the future is yours.

Today I can only mention the words inscribed on the tricolor flags waving over the undergrounds on the eve of the "cease-fire":

--CONFIDENCE

--HOPE

--REMAIN UNITED.

If these feelings survive in your trials, everything is possible.

Air Support

Total of S.O.A. (expansion unknown) Activities for the Benefit of the Undergrounds  
513-1) Table of Air Activities, Transport Support

3		Au profil de									
		MATERIEL					2 PERSONNEL				
9	TOTALX	DAKOTA	Tonnage	DZ utilise	TOTAL GENERAL MEMBER	DAKOTA	Sault O'S.	Sault liaison	Nb. DZ. CO utilise	Total général heures	28,35
		59	14,015	4	2	2	74	1	2	2	
	CHOCOLAT	247	602,715	31	1	1	3	1	1	2	
	GAMMA	5	13,720	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	
	ALPHA	19	43,810	10	1	1	5	1	1	2	
	CASTOR	2	3,340	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	POLLUX	29	76,100	3	1	1	3	1	1	1	
	MONDAY	361	683,700	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	9 TOTALX				1279						

Key: 1-Material, 2-personnel, 3-for benefit of, 4-dropping zone used, 5-hours, General total, 6-operation jumps, 7-command jumps, 8-number of dropping zone used, 9-totals.

# The Balance Sheet

## The Operations

List of the Principal Operations in Which the North Vietnam Regional Representation Participated Between 1 December 1952 and 27 July 1954

Dates	Places	Names of Operations
16 Dec 1952 to	West edge of the Dien Bien Phu basin	Lt. Castagnoni's Group
1 May 1953	Dien Bien Phu	"Grenoble" parachuting of 48 commandos
20 Mar 1953	Yao San Meo (Province of Lai Chau)	Raid of 80 GMI partisans (Cardamone)
3 June 1953	Phong Tho	Capture of the town and development of Cardamone
17 July 1953	Lang Son	Hirondelle, 50 GCMA commandos
From May 1953 to Sep 1953	Cotank plateau, Muong Lam (on the Song Ma) and RP 41 (Thuan Chau)	Raid of the team of Captain Hebert and Sgt. Chatel, Commando Group 8, development of Colibri
3 Oct 1953 to 18 Oct 1953	Lao Kay	Chau Quan Thin Operation, parachuting 50 commandos to the Coc Leu outskirts
1 Sep 1953 to	Colibri underground,	Repression operation conducted by
30 Nov 1953	RP 41 and Song Ma	8 Viet Minh battalions
7 Oct 1953	Chapa	Occupation of the town by Cardamone
19 Oct 1953	Binh Lu	Sater Operation. Capture of the town by Cardamone
Nov 1953	Muong Khoa, Than Uyen	Capture of communities and Dakota strips by "Khone Say" partisans
Nov to Dec 1953	Phong Tho, Chapa, Binh Lu, Than Uyen	Viet Minh repression operation conducted by 3 battalions against Cardamone and Khone Say

Dates	Places--	Names of Operations
Nov 1953	Phong Saly	Attack on the province by 2 Viet Minh battalions (910 and 920, 148)
7 Dec 1953	Phong Saly	Recapture of the town by Condor
Counterattack of 7 Dec 1953	Northwest Thai country	Reception of Lai Chau escapees by Gamma partisans
Jan 1954	Muong Te, Muong Nghie	Recapture of communities by Gamma partisans
from Dec 1953 to May 1954	Dien Bien Phu	Participation of Commando Group 3 in the Resistance Center operations, parachuting of 25 commandos east and northeast of the Resistance Center
Same	Right bank of the Red River between Than Uyen and Nghia Lo	Extension of guerrillas toward the south and the Yen Bay-Ta Khoa highway, immobilization of 13 Viet Minh battalions in the guerrilla zones. Parachuting 400 commandos behind the Viet Minh.
Feb-Mar 1954	Phong Saly	Attack of 3 Viet Minh battalions, 910/148, 920/148, 999/176, against Condor-Vautour.
Mar-May 1954	Right bank of Red River	Repression operation of 9 Viet Minh battalions against friendly guerrillas of Cardamone, Khone Say and Hanns Khan.
4 May 1954	Outay (North Laos)	Parachuting a commando (70 men). Recapture of the town and the strip.
May-June 1954	Province of Than Uyen, Muong Djone, Muong Kim, Black River	Guerrilla operations retaking control of region east of Than Uyen and crossing the Black River to the south.

Dates	Places	Names of Operations
May 1954	Northeast of Pa Kha	Parachuting a 48-man commando to recreate the Chocolat zone
July 1954	Pa Kha	Parachuting 72 commandos. Capture of the town with guerrillas. Restoration of the strip condition.
Same	Muong Soi	Capture of airstrip.

Note. The period under consideration was marked by more than 1,200 personnel parachuted into the enemy rear zone and the execution of special missions in favor of the FTL (Laotian Ground Forces) and the FTNV (North Vietnam Ground Forces) (Sam Neua, Moc Chau-Na San, Tuan Giao, Hoa Binh and Lang Son).

#### Citations

Status No. 1

Summary of Individual Citations Awarded to the Personnel of the North Vietnam Regional Representation Since 15 December 1952.

3- GRADES	DECORATIONS ET CITATIONS								11 OBSERVAT.
	3 OFF. L.H.	4 LEG. HON.	5 H.M.	6 ARMEE	7 C.A.	8 DIV.	9 BRIG.	10 RGT	
Off. Supérieurs 12				2	1				
Off. Subalternes 13	1	6		23	8	7	2		
Cit. Autochtones 14				8		1		1	
s/Off. Européens 15		2	13	16	17	10	5	13	
Cit. Suppléants 16				5	10	4	8	16	
s/Off. Autochtones 17				1	5	4	5	5	
s/Off. Suppléants 18				4	4	14	11	25	
Suppléants et Pert. 19					7	53	103	261	



Key: 1-decorations and citations, 2-ranks, 3-Officer of the Legion of Honor, 4-Legion of Honor, 5-unknown abbreviation, 6-Army, 7-Army Corps, 8-Division, 9-Brigade, 10-Regiment, 11-Comments, 12-Field officers, 13-junior officers, 14-native officers, 15-European noncommissioned officers, 16-auxiliary officers, 17-native noncommissioned officers, 18-auxiliary noncommissioned officers, 19-auxiliaries and partisans.

Status No. 2

Summary of Individual Citations In Process of Confirmation

2 GRADES	1 DECORATIONS ET CITATIONS								11 OBSERVAT.
	3 OFF. LH.	4 LEG. HON.	5 M.M.	6 ARMEE	7 C.A.	8 DIV.	9 BRIG.	10 RGT.	
Off. Supérieurs / 12									
Off. Subalternes / 13				8	2	2			
Off. Assemblées / 14	1			2		1			
Off. Européens / 15				2	12	3	8	1	
Off. Assemblées / 16		1	1		1	3	1	1	
Off. Supérieurs / 17		2	2			3	1	1	
Off. Supérieurs / 18			3	8	8	19	4	3	
Off. Supérieurs / 19				2	14	23	23	37	

Key: 1-decorations and citations, 2-ranks, 3-Officer of the Legion of Honor, 4-Legion of Honor, 5-unknown abbreviation, 6-Army, 7-Army Corps, 8-Division, 9-Brigade, 10-Regiment, 11-Comments, 12-Field officers, 13-junior officers, 14-native officers, 15-European noncommissioned officers, 16-native noncommissioned officers, 17-auxiliary officers, 18-auxiliary noncommissioned officers, 19-auxiliaries and partisans.

Text Proposed for a Citation for the Order of the Army

The North Vietnam Composite Intervention Group Regional Representation particularly distinguished itself during the years 1953-1954 under the instigation of Battalion Chief Roger Fournier.

With the mission of organizing armed resistance in the provinces occupied by the Viet Minh, namely in the High Region of North Vietnam, since 1 January 1953 it has raised and armed more than 10,000 partisans organized into 19 groups, operating behind the rebels in a zone covering more than 30,000 square kilometers.

In May 1953 it formed in the Muong Lam-Tuan Chau region an underground of 2,400 armed men who covered the evacuation of Na San (October 1953) by their operations; attacked in November 1953 by six Viet Minh battalions and forced to retreat into the Cotonh plateau and then gone underground, it inflicted heavy losses on the rebels and contributed to disorganizing a regiment of the 316th Division.

In July 1953, in the Phong Tho-Tham Uyen provinces, it established an underground of 4,000 weapons. On 3 October 1953, during a bold raid at Lao Kay, coupled with the parachuting of underground commandos, the partisans blew up the Red River bridge, inflicting a serious blow on the rebel military potential of this region.

Attacked from November 1953 to June 1954 by eight regular battalions and 12 district companies, on whom it inflicted heavy losses, the undergrounds succeeded in remaining through their incessant guerrilla activities in their zone of action and in disorganizing the 183rd Battalion of the 246th Regiment.

In 40 days, from May to June 1954, after having parachuted a contact team, it completely succeeded in forming an underground of 200 weapons on the left bank of the Upper Red River. After severe battles, the particularly active partisans put to flight the rebel units in this sector and occupied Pa Kha, Nghia Do, Yen Binh Xa, Hoang Su Phi, Phalong and Phorang, inflicting heavy losses on the Viet Minh.

At the same time an underground of 1,800 weapons was formed in the Sam Teu province. Going immediately into action, it destroyed a rebel unit at Muong Soi on 5 June 1954.

It parachuted more than 1,200 personnel, maintaining a climate of insecurity in the rear Viet Minh zone.

Thus, through its intense operational activity, the North Vietnam Regional Representation permanently held down 15 Viet Minh battalions in the High Region, inflicting the following losses on the rebels in the years 1953-1954:

3,500 killed and wounded, 100 prisoners. THIS CITATION INCLUDES THE AWARD OF THE T.O.E. (expansion unknown) OF THE CROSS OF WAR WITH PALM FOR BATTALION LEADER FOURNIER.

S.P. 99.473, 30 August 1954

Lieutenant-Colonel Trinquier

Composite Intervention Group Commander

Human Losses

1 PERTES AMIES

A. — <sup>2</sup> EUROPEENS	
• <sup>3</sup> Tués	: 2 <sup>6</sup> Officiers (Cne RICHARD — Lt CUZOL) 17 <sup>7</sup> s/Officiers (MONTFORT)
• <sup>4</sup> Blessés	: 4 <sup>6</sup> Officiers 3 <sup>7</sup> s/Officiers
• <sup>5</sup> Disparus	: 4 <sup>6</sup> Officiers 14 <sup>8</sup> s/Officiers et Corporaux.
B. — <sup>9</sup> AUTOCHTONES REGULIERS	
• <sup>5</sup> Disparus	: 37 <sup>7</sup> s/Officiers 310 <sup>10</sup> hommes de troupe
C. — PARTISANS	
• <sup>3</sup> Tués	: 1 500 <sup>11</sup> //
• <sup>5</sup> Blessés	: 252 évacués, plus de 1 500 non évacués.

12 PERTES REBELLES

• <sup>13</sup> Tués et blessés	: estimés à 3 500 hommes hors de combat
• <sup>14</sup> Prisonniers et Ralliés	: près de 1 000.

Key: 1-Friendly losses, 2-Europeans, 3-killed, 4-wounded, 5-disappeared,  
6-officers, 7-noncommissioned officers, 8-noncommissioned officers and corporals,  
9-regular natives, 10-troops, 11-evacuated, more than 1,500 non-evacuated,  
12-rebel losses, 13-killed and wounded: estimated at 3,500 men out of combat,  
14-prisoners and won over; nearly 1,000.

Material Recovery and Losses

1 PERTES AMIES

A. — ARMEMENT

43 armes automatiques<sup>2</sup>  
212 pistolets mitrailleurs<sup>3</sup>  
1253 fusils<sup>4</sup>  
1 mortier de 81<sup>5</sup>  
4 mortiers de 60<sup>6</sup>

B. — RADIO

5 postes SCR 694<sup>7</sup>  
22 postes SCR 536<sup>8</sup>

9 PERTES REBELLES EN MATÉRIEL

A. — ARMEMENT

185 armes automatiques<sup>2</sup>  
1600 fusils<sup>4</sup>  
248 pistolets mitrailleurs<sup>3</sup>  
47 mortiers tous calibres<sup>11</sup>  
100 tonnes de munitions diverses<sup>12</sup>

B. — VIVRES<sup>13</sup>

250 tonnes de paddy en dépôt<sup>14</sup>

Key: 1-friendly losses, 2-automatic weapons, 3-automatic pistols, 4-rifles, 5-1 81 mm mortar, 6-60 mm mortars, 7-SCR 694 sets, 8-SCR 536 sets, 9-rebel losses of material, 10-rifles, 11-mortars of all calibers, 12-tons of various kinds of ammunition, 13-food, 14-tons of stored paddy.

Colonel Roger Trinquier

Born 20 March 1908 in the Hautes-Alpes province. 1922, Aix-en-Provence Normal School. 1928, Saint-Maixent. 1932, Second Lieutenant in a frontier post in Tonkin. 1937-1938, transferred to the Maginot Line. 1938, Guard company of the French embassy in Peking and then Aide to the Colonel Commanding the French troops in Shanghai. 1946, Commanded the B 4 Commando of the Ponchardier Commando. 1947, Created the 2nd BCCP with Battalion Chief Dupuis (the first battalion of colonial paratroopers set up). September 1948, took command of the 2nd BCCP. January 1950, commanded the Instruction Center of the Colonial Troops at Frejus, later the Jump School of Vannes-Meucon. May 1953, commanded the GCMA. February 1955, various training periods in France. August 1956, Aide to General Massu in Algeria. 1957, Battle of Algiers with the 3rd RFC (expansion unknown). April 1958, took command of the 3rd RFC following Col. Bigeard. 13 May 1958, with General Massu formed the Committee of Public Safety at Algiers. June 1959, took command of the El Milia sector. December 1960, appointed Aide to the General Commanding the military subdivision of Nice. January-April 1961, charged by Pierre Messmer to organize the Katanga Army.

1 wound on 13 August 1948 at Lai Thieu with the 2nd BCCP.

Commander of the Legion of Honor since 3 May 1957.

14 citations, including 10 of the Order of the Army.

# Table of Abbreviations

ECCE	Colonial Battalion of Parachute Commandos
REP	Foreign Parachute Battalion
BPVN	Vietnamese Parachute Battalion
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CLHFR	Committee of Liberation of the Upper Red River
DGD	General Office of Documentation
DI	Infantry Division
DZ	Dropping Zone
EMIFT	Inter-Army General Staff of the Ground Forces
EMO-BAP	Operational General Staff of Airborne Bases
FTVN	North Vietnam Ground Forces
FEP	Snipers and Partisans
CCMA	Airborne Composite Commando Group
GMI	Composite Intervention Group
CONO	Northwest Operational Group
MS	Special Missions
PC	Command Post
RC	Colonial Highway
RP	Provincial Highway
KPV	Assembly of Vietnamese Patriots
RR	Regional Representation
RTM	Moroccan Rifle Regiment
SDECE	Foreign Documentation and Counter-Espionage Service
SRO	Operational Intelligence Service
TAPI	Airborne Troops in Indochina
VM	Viet Minh
ZANO	Northwest Autonomous Zone


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